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The paper presents a systematic re-analysis of the Costa Concordia incident using the domains of 
Human Factors Integration (HFI) completed by undergraduate naval architects.  
The importance of the human element in the passenger ship industry, from the design stage of a 
ship to the end of its operational life, has developed through time. Human element considerations 
are becoming increasingly significant as a tool for creating efficient and safe working environments 
in the shipping industry. The human element is particularly important for passenger ships due to the 
number of people, complexity of operations and the resulting complexity of human interaction with 
the ship and its systems.  
 
The work was carried out in collaboration between Lloyd’s Register and Southampton Marine and 
Maritime Institute of the University of Southampton. An applicable understanding of the human 
element topic was developed using textbooks, public bodies of information and EU project HCD 
training.  Methodologies used by investigative bodies were explored to apply the human element to 
incidents particularly involving passenger ships. The Costa Concordia public report was reviewed 
to elicit an extensive event listing.  These events were generalised into themes specific to the Costa 
Concordia incidents. The limitations of current statutory rules and regulations were highlighted 
against these themes and the domains of (HFI).  
The results were analysed to identify regulatory shortfalls (gaps, inconsistencies, and limitations), 
and present the distribution of events and regulations under incident themes and HFI domains. The 
paper will report these findings.   
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Investigation 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents the work done on re-analysing the Costa Concordia incident using human 
element investigative methods in a collaboration between Lloyd’s Register and Southampton 
Marine and Maritime Institute of the University of Southampton. A range of bodies of knowledge 
were studied to acquire an applicable understanding of the Human Element (HE) (IMO Assembly, 
2003). The different methodologies used by investigative bodies were explored to find an effective 
way to apply the gained knowledge of the human element to accidents, particularly those involving 
passenger ships.  
 
Within the passenger ship industry it is important to recognise the significance of the reputation of a 
ship, and thus the company. In an age where news is able to communicate events in real time and 
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also available to everyone through technology, it is important to find the root cause of the incident 
by investigating every aspect. Within passenger ships, because of a greater number of human and 
ship interactions, a broader range of topics needs to be analysed to find the underlying problem. 
Therefore, an approach that includes the human element in the analysis of an accident allows for a 
more comprehensive approach to understanding the issue and helps perceive the complexity 
resulting from having a large number of humans on a ship. 
 
This paper reports the development of a tool to address this need by addressing human element 
design considerations into a forensic investigative framework which can be applied to real life 
incidents. For this paper the Costa Concordia incident has been used as a case study. The study was 
suggested by Richard Vie (retired VP Technical Development and Quality Assurance of Carnival 
Corporaton & Plc) after he noted that many events and issues within the Costa Concordia could be 
related to the Human Factor Integration (HFI) domains from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD).  
 
In applying a HFI framework to the Costa Concordia incident, human element issues and events 
were uncovered which contributed to the grounding and the management of the emergency 
evacuation post grounding. This led to the development of a means by which the findings of an 
incident can be described with respect to the human element.  
 
2. Development of Human Element Incident Analysis Tools 
There are different methods to go about investigating a maritime incident. As stated by the 
Maritime Accident Investigative Branch (MAIB), “The sole objective of the investigation of an 
accident under these regulations shall be the prevention of future accidents through ascertainment of 
its causes and circumstances” (Secretary of State for Transport, 2005). Within this quote, the main 
purpose of investigative bodies is unmistakably identified, and it is clear why it is important to 
analyse fully all accidents. However, different investigative bodies focus on different topics and 
facts. This paper demonstrates that an investigation should go beyond seeing human error as the 
cause of an incident, and has to use knowledge about human factors to understand why this error 
occurred and thus understand in what way it can be prevented in the future. 
 
As is often mistaken, the human element should not only be regarded as the management of people 
and making sure they complete their duties on board a ship. The human element also refers to the 
interaction between the ship and the human and his environment. The skills, limitation and needs of 
the human have to be considered within the design of the ship and throughout the ship’s operation. 
It is therefore necessary to apply the knowledge on all aspects of the human element within incident 
investigation methodologies to qualitatively measure shortfalls in the ship’s design and operations. 
This will lead to the human error being the start of the investigation, rather than the end.  
 
The IMO investigation framework adopted and further developed by the MAIB can be considered 
the most complete investigative method in operation. However, it is of a forensic nature and only 
analyses the event. When MAIB reports on an accident they use a timeline method to explore all the 
possible causes of the accident. In starting this timeline they look for a type of cause from the 
following; machinery failure, environmental (unpredictable event), properties of cargo and human 
error event. Then they look for the recovery mechanism. This line of event reporting assumes a 
narrow line of casualization for the event. However, many events could be the summation of 
multiple failures, suggesting a large variety of different lines which could need investigating. 
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Systemic Analysis 
In January 2006 at the ‘Learning from Marine Accidents III’ RINA conference Vaughan Pomeroy 
and Brian Sherwood Jones presented a paper which set out a new way to look at accident analysis 
and reporting, it was called ‘Learning from experience – Adopting a systems approach to the 
analysis of marine incidents’ (Pomeroy and Jones 2006).  
 
Their paper proposes that current analysis of accidents does not allow for any future development 
and implies that the only way the industry can move forward is through serious incidents. They 
proposed taking the basic accidents, then using a mind map flow diagram to think through the 
incident to find more general themes. Then to work forward to say what would have happened. If 
presented well this way of reporting means more people can understand what happened and help the 
industry as a whole move forward and find more industry-wide systemic failures. As seen in in their 
paper they have taken a loss of a vessel and then using different themes identified events to work 
towards the contributory factors to the incident under six general headings.  
 
These six headings attributed to the different areas of the lifecycle of a ship allow the use of the 
mind map to assign the events to the different headings and thus to the different stake holders. This 
way of generalising events into broader themes to identify the stake holders and their responsibility 
in an incident addresses the larger scope of the incident and impact on all the parties involved. This 
way of generalizing events will be used below. Systemic analysis also focuses on the humans 
within the system, not the system itself like over methods. 
 
Human Factors Integration 
Later in 2006 the UK’s Ministry of Defence’s Sea Systems Group published Management and 
Technical guide to HFI. In these documents they set out a new way to develop and assess the 
procurement of parts for use in Military situations. They described a set of 6 domains, set out in 
Table 1, which could cover all aspects of the human integration with systems. They were set out in 
the Management guide (MAP-01-010) (MoD Sea Systems Group, 2006) with the goal of helping to 
achieve optimum operational performance.  
 
A benefit of this framework is the use of the technical guide (MAP-01-011) provides in-depth 
information on the different areas to be covered and the different issues in each area. This allows 
anyone to see what they might have to consider and the technical specification associated with it, 
similar to Alert!’s “Tablemat” (Squire, 2006). These considerations can help planning at an early 
stage to find who they need to consult to properly consider all of the human-system issues and 
interactions.  
They also see that there is no perfect system and that in the design stage certain trade-offs will have 
to be made with the overall balance in mind, they have highlighted the following; 
 
 Reduction in manpower numbers vs the cost of increased automation. 
 Reduction in manpower numbers vs increased personnel skill requirements 
 The cost of simplification of the user interface vs increases in training time. 
 Reduction in operator manpower vs increases in support manpower and skill requirements. 
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The generic HFI domains are have been marinised and elaborated into specific considerations in 
Alert!’s ‘Tablemat’ (Alert! 40). These considerations can help planning at an early stage to find 
who they need to consult to properly consider all of the human-system issues and interactions. 
 
3. Incident Analysis Methodology 
To better assess the human element within an incident the new method proposed within this paper 
combines investigative procedures to HFI design considerations. Re-analysing the accident from a 
human element perspective allows for particular observations to be made, which might have not 
been considered using other investigative methods. This method is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
Step 1: Every event and human element issue within the Costa Concordia incident was found from 
the investigative report. These were then sorted under the Human Factor Integration domains. 
 
Step 2: These domains were used because they allow a better assessment of what aspect of the 
human element is being considered in the event, whether it is manpower, personnel, training, 
human factor engineering, system safety, or health hazards. These domains were used because they 
provide a more complete framework of looking at elements than the IMO’s or Lloyd’s Register’s 
Alert! Human element considerations. The lack of a comprehensive human element structure in the 
commercial industry has meant that the optimum method of analysing the accident is using a 
framework which the industry does not have available. In addition to the six domains defined by 
MoD, and made to focus on the marine sector, an extra survivability domain was added. This 
human element domain is defined as any action taken or system available post casualty to decrease 
damage, loss of lives and facilitate evacuation. 
 
Step 3: Because of the large amount of events and HE issues, these were categorized into broader 
HE topics that would convey the principal themes of these issues. The human element themes 
defined are given in Table 2. The category about the cooperation procedures between the ship and 
SAR was formulated because of the reporting method of the Marine Casualty Investigative Body 
that works together with the Italian coast guard.  
 
Step 4: The IMO regulations, codes, resolutions, circulars, and guidelines are analysed to assess to 
what extent they cover the human element themes defined in this report. These regulations and 
documents were found using Lloyd’s Register Rulefinder 9.23 (January 2015) – Statutory 
Documents program. Key word searching was used, on top of previous knowledge of the structure 
Identifying events 
and Human 
Element issues 
within the Costa 
Concordia 
accident
Sort issues under 
DERA Human 
Factor Integration 
Domains
Categorizing 
Human Element 
Issues into 
broader themes
Identifiying 
limitations in IMO 
regulations with 
regards to Human 
Element themes
Figure 1  Flow diagram of methodology to consider the HE in incident analysis, and 
limitation s within the IMO regulatory documents. 
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of regulation. Also, a guidance note on human element publications from the IMO (Lloyd's Register 
Marine Product Development , 2010) was used to direct the search for circulars and resolutions. 
 
The layout of the final matrix is shown in Table 3. The principal vertical column shows the HE 
themes, and the principal horizontal row represents the HFI domains. Within each HFI domain 
there are two columns for stating the IMO publications and beside it the limitations or comments 
that have come up when reading the documents.  
 
4. Analyses of Results 
4.1 Distribution of Events and Regulation 
To understand the matrix which was discussed in the previous section one view of the results is 
through a look at the numerical distribution of regulations, events, and Human Element issues 
within the different domains. This analysis gives an overview of the varying approaches by the 
industry, and even how effective they might have been in this case. However, it should be stated 
that this is purely based on numbers of regulations and events, not quality. This will be discussed in 
the following section. 
 
A summation across the different domains for events and regulations with the difference between 
the regulations and events were calculated, this is displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Three cases were found: firstly, where there are large number of regulations and events (small 
difference), secondly being where there are more events than regulations (negative difference), and 
finally high regulations and few events (large difference).  In the first case, as seen in ‘Health 
Hazards and ‘Personnel’, this could point to regulation which is not implemented correctly or 
poorly written. For the second case there are again two examples, ‘Manpower’ and ‘Training’. 
These both have many regulations meaning the issues may arise again from bad implementation in 
the industry, or the low number of regulations coming from the fact that a large document with high 
coverage is counted only once. The final case has again a large documentation background, but in 
Figure 2  Distribution of Events and Human Element Issues, Regulations, and the difference 
between them. 
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very technically specific area. This could be a sign of ‘over-regulation’, but did still allow for some 
events to occur in the incident. 
 
4.2 Findings - Regulations 
This analysis identified issues in the incident that should have been covered by IMO regulations. It 
found that existing protocols are limited in their coverage of the HE, resulting in regulations which 
do not fully act as preventing measures for incidents. A topic which has arisen from the analysis of 
the incident is the assumption of perfect human performance in the regulations. Regulations such as 
MSC.1/Circ1251 ‘Guideline on the control of ships in an emergency’ (Maritime Safety Committee, 
2007) assume that the master of a ship will remain in control of the vessel and will tell the SAR 
authorities everything they need to know. In reality however, as has been shown from the Costa 
Concordia incident, this is not always the case. This resilience on the human in an emergency 
situation to perform advanced procedures seems to be unrealistic.  
 
Another finding was whether the deaths in the incident occurred, and whether they were passengers 
or crew members. This distribution lead us to investigate the use of the elevator as a means of 
escape. In SOLAS Chapter II-1- Part D- Regulation 42 – “Emergency Source of Electrical Power in 
Passenger Ships,” it states that the emergency source of electrical power shall be sufficient to 
supply all those services that are essential for safety in an emergency, and has to bring the lift car to 
deck level (International Maritime Orgnaization, 1980). Also, SOLAS regulation II-2/28.4 states 
that in no case should lifts be considered as forming one of the required means of escape. However, 
the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at its sixty-ninth session, approved guidelines on human 
element considerations for the design and management of emergency escape arrangements on 
passenger ships. These guidelines, recognized within MSC Circular 846, state that “in emergencies, 
lifts may be used as an additional means of escape, provided they are controlled by the assigned 
member of the crew and are supplied from the ship’s emergency source of electrical power. 
Members of the crew should be assigned to manually operate each lift designated for use in 
emergencies, and to clear and shut down lifts which are not to be used” (Maritime Safety 
Committee, 1998). Unfortunately, MSC Circular 846 provides a loophole for the use of elevators in 
an emergency. 
 
As seen within the Costa Concordia incident, although the lifts are meant to attach to the emergency 
source of electrical power, if the electrical power does not run smoothly, or the emergency 
generator has difficulty in connecting to the emergency switchboard, the elevators will not function 
effectively, leading to people being trapped within them.  
 
4.3 Findings – Analysis Tool 
This tool was also able to determine that within the industry there are many well written and easy to 
follow regulations. However, because of the limitations of these regulations in addressing the HE, 
this tool supports the IMO resolution A.947 (23) “Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for 
the Organization” (IMO Assembly, 2003) in combination with Resolution MSC.287 (87) 
“Adoption of the International Goal-Based Ship Construction Standards for Bulk Carriers and Oil 
Tankers” (IMO , 2010) to develop a new approach to tackle the role of the HE in regulation. This 
approach should be goal based, rather than traditional prescription.  
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It was found that there are traces of goal based standards in existing regulation, mostly within 
guidelines and circulars. The “Guidelines for Engine-Room Layout, Design and Arrangement” 
(Maritime Safety Committee, 1998) are a mixture of the usual checklist approach and goal based 
standards. The first section on lighting level is a series of check boxes, which on one hand can be 
used as a reference for a basic level of operational effectiveness, but on the other hand results in 
limited innovation for new design systems. The section on ergonomics uses goal based standards, as 
given in this example. “A noise-protected communication station should be installed in the general 
area that most maintenance and watchkeeping activities take place, such as the engine-room lower 
level or pump flat, and outside the control room, when a control room is provided.” Within this 
regulation it allows for different designs of engine rooms and systems that may be used. It allows a 
designer to think about the use and situation it is in. 
 
Similarly, a resolution which can and should be developed into a goal based regulation for 
considering the human element in ship design and ship operations is MSC-MEPC.7/Circular.3 – 
“Framework for IMO Consideration of Ergonomics and Work Environment.”  The circular 
recognizes that the seafarer is the “ship’s primary protector of maritime safety and security” (MSC 
& MEPC, 2006). The circular states that the IMO should have five main key considerations for 
ergonomics on board ships to reduce P&I claims and human error. These are: manual valve 
operation access, location and orientation, stairs, vertical ladders, ramps, walkways and walk 
platforms, inspection and maintenance considerations, and the application of ergonomics to design. 
With the definitions of these considerations within the circular, goal base standards can be 
developed for ships in operation and for new builds. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
A better, human-centred approach to incident analysis and ship design is needed to create a more 
pre-emptive culture as the industry advances.  Investigative methods to analyse major accidents are 
well developed and implemented in the maritime industry. However, as discussed in this paper, a 
post analysis of an incident is a useful tool to evaluate less familiar perspectives which can 
highlight previously unseen root causes. 
 
By re-analysing the Costa Concordia incident we identified Human Element issues which 
contributed to the grounding and also to post grounding events. Because of the complexity of 
passenger ships, the impact of human factors in the emergency procedures was more significant to 
the overall casualty than the human element issues leading up to the grounding. As observed from 
this paper the majority of the IMO’s statutory documents are concerned primarily with operational 
limitations to maintain safety and ship systems within emergency procedures. However, the 
effectiveness of these regulations is restricted because of their limitations in addressing the human 
element.  
 
When the tool developed in this paper is applied to an incident it highlights limitations and 
deficiencies in statutory IMO documents. The paper supports the development of goal based 
standards in regulation to cover the human element. This study did not include Class Rules. Gaps 
related to regulation and the event that could be addressed by class are not described in this report. 
However, this gap could be suggestions for new areas improving the rules to a more human element 
focus system.  
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To conclude, analysing incidents from a human element perspective can allow for a better 
understanding of how the ship is used and where danger areas are. The approach described in this 
paper is a useful tool to identify human element issues for designers, operators, ship owners, 
surveyors, maritime accident investigators and also students. 
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8. Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  HFI Domains as set out in MAP-01-010 (MoD Sea Systems Group, 2006) 
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Table 2  Human Element Themes Definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human Element Topic Definition 
Seafarer within Emergency Procedures  
The reliance of the emergency procedure on 
the number of crew available and the 
performance of the crew. 
Ship's Detection System 
How well the ship is able to assess the 
condition of the ship and relate information to 
the sea farer 
Competence of Senior Officers 
Whether the officers in charge are capable of 
making decisions in emergency situation with 
the correct support 
Working Systems of Compartments within a 
Ship 
The interrelationship of compartments and 
systems within compartments including the 
workability of the environment. 
Evacuation Systems 
The evacuation and escape arrangements for 
passengers and crew. 
Actions in navigational procedures 
How much of the navigation relies on active 
participation of the seafarer and his presence. 
Inadequacy in Communication 
How the ship's crew communicates with each 
other and with the bridge and vice versa. 
Cooperation procedures between the Ship and 
SAR 
The process of the ship collaborating with the 
SAR, assuring the safety of passengers, cargo, 
ship, environment and crew 
Operational Limitations to maintain safety 
How well systems are integrated to provide 
continuous safety in normal and abnormal 
operations 
Weakness in Company Requirements 
The Company's responsibility to consider the 
human element within operations and 
emergency procedures 
Ship Systems within emergency procedures 
Socio-technical integration of ship systems in 
emergency procedures. 
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Table 3  Example Final Matrix Layout. 
